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Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive Damages:
Down But Not Out
NiCHoLAs K. KIE*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court this past term dealt a staggering blow
to civil litigants wishing to attack awards of punitive damages on consti-
tutional grounds. In the case of Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v.
Kelco Disposal,' the Court concluded that the excessive fines clause is only
intended to curb governmental action and does not serve to limit damage
awards in private lawsuits. The Court thus removed one constitutional
weapon from the defense bar's arsenal. 2
Defendants in private actions have not yet been knocked out, however.
There remains one viable constitutional means of attacking exemplary
awards that the Court has not yet faced. This remaining challenge relies on
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1987,
Butler University.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
2. Id. at 2912. Additionally, this past term, the Court signalled in dicta the death knell
for any challenge on punitive damages under the double jeopardy clause by limiting the
application of that clause to actions by the government. In United States v. Halper, 109 S.
Ct. 1892 (1989), the Court held that the double jeopardy clause is violated when the government
seeks a purely punitive civil penalty that bears no relation to actual loss from a defendant
who has been previously criminally convicted for the same conduct. In the closing lines of the
Court's opinion, Justice Blackmun noted "nothing in today's opinion precludes a private party
from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was the subject of criminal
prosecution and punishment. The protections of the Double Jeopardy clause are not triggered
by litigation between private parties." Id. at 1903.
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This Note will argue that the due process clause has always been the
better challenge to punitive awards and that the Court was correct in
rejecting the eighth amendment argument. Part I discusses the nature of
punitive damages and the role they play in society. Part II reviews the
history of the excessive fines argument, culminating with a discussion of
the Browning-Ferris opinion. Part III addresses the views of six Supreme
Court Justices that lend credence to the due process argument. Part IV lays
a framework for applying the due process clause to limit punitive awards.
This Note concludes by showing how the due process challenge has always
been a better approach to limiting the punitive damage remedy than the
excessive fines challenge.
I. ROLE OF PuNiTIvE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are damages in addition to compensatory damages.
Punitive damages are designed to punish the defendant for his outrageous
conduct and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.'
Punishment plays a vital role in the civil law by filling gaps left by the
criminal law. Certain conduct is sufficiently reprehensible that society feels
obligated to punish the wrongdoer and to deter other would-be wrongdoers.
Yet, for various reasons, the criminal law does not always perform this
task adequately. Sometimes it is because criminal dockets are so swamped
that prosecutors do not feel justified in prosecuting a less serious case.4
Other times, especially with corporate wrongdoers, the criminal law does
not sufficiently punish and deter particular actors.5
The need for a "gap-filler" may be seen in the Ford Pinto litigation. A
design defect in the Pinto automobile caused fuel to leak from the gasoline
tank when struck from behind, often resulting in an explosive fire. A
relatively minor adjustment by the manufacturer would have corrected the
defect, thus preventing the possibility of disaster. The Ford Motor Company
decided, based on a cost-benefit analysis, to risk the lives of hundreds of
people rather than make the adjustment. Ford concluded that it would cost
3. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS declares:
1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.
2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of
the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In
assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character
of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that
the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
4. See 1 J. GBmtRni & J. KiRcnER, PutmnivE DAMAGES LAW & PAcnci §§ 2.01-.13
(1988).
5. Id.
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the company more money to make the repair than to pay judgments for
wrongful death. Several people lost their lives as a result of Ford's decision. 6
Very few would doubt that Ford's decision was socially unacceptable and
deserved punishment. Ford's cynical decision is the very type that society
needs to deter and wants to punish. However, the Ford Motor Company
and its officers escaped criminal liability. 7 The criminal law was thus
inadequate in performing its roles of punishment and deterrence.
Punitive damages, however, can serve to fill the void when the criminal
law proves inadequate. In a suit against Ford brought by a private plaintiff,
Ford suffered a punitive damage judgment of $125 million.' Through such
measures in the civil law, a giant like Ford can be effectively punished,
thus insuring that other such giants will not follow Ford's reprehensible
lead. Therefore, punitive damages are necessary and useful to serve the
purposes of the criminal law: the punishment and deterrence of unacceptable
conduct.
Justice O'Connor noted in Browning-Ferris, however, that punitive dam-
ages have their faults. Because of their uncontrolled growth and their
unpredictable size, punitive damages are having a chilling effect on industrial
research and development.9 Moreover, at least one commentator attributes
the increasing unavailability of insurance coverage to punitive damages, and
argues the lack of insurance has precipitated the bankruptcy of many
companies. 0 It is therefore not surprising that many defendants have
searched for a shield from punitive damages.
II. HISTORY OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CHALLENGE
Most recently, defendants have looked to the Constitution as a means
for attacking punitive damages. The aspects of punishment and deterrence
at the core of punitive damages formed the basis for a series of appeals to
the United States Supreme Court, challenging exemplary awards as violating
the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment." These decisions cul-
minated in Browning-Ferris.
6. Note, Corporate Homicide: The Stark Reality of Artificial Beings and Human Fictions,
8 PEPPERDiNE L. R-v. 367, 372-74 (1981).
7. Id. at 370.
8. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(The court, however, ordered a remittitur to $3.5 million. Id. at 772, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358).
9. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see infra notes 45-114 and accompanying text.
10. See Comment, Punitive Damages: The Burden of Proof Required by Procedural Due
Process, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 99 (1987) (predicting that punitive damages will cause more
bankruptcies, leading to increased concentration in the marketplace and a resultant decline in
competition).
11. The eighth amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
1989]
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The first case was Bankers Life and Casualty v. Crenshaw,12 decided on
May 16, 1988. In Bankers Life, the plaintiff had dropped an alternator on
his foot. The injury grew much worse, resulting in the necessary amputation
of part of the foot. The defendant insurance company was obligated under
its insurance policy to pay proceeds for amputations that were not the result
of a pre-existing condition. The insurance company claimed that the dete-
rioration of the foot was due to pre-existing arteriosclerosis and refused to
pay.' 3
At trial, the jury found the insurance company in breach of contract.
Additionally, the jury found the breach to be in bad faith. The jury then
awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages and $1.6 million in punitive
damages.' 4 The insurance company eventually argued before the United
States Supreme Court that the punitive award under Mississippi tort law
violated the excessive fines and due process clauses of the federal Consti-
tution. 15 The Supreme Court held the appellant had failed to preserve its
constitutional challenges in the lower courts. Thus, the Court did not reach
the constitutional challenges in its opinion.' 6
Two weeks later, the Supreme Court summarily disposed of eight more
cases concerning the constitutionality of punitive damages. The Court denied
writ of certiorari in four of the cases,17 thus denying them any precedential
authority from the High Court. In the remaining four cases, however, the
Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.' 8 The
cases dismissed for want of a substantial federal question became binding
decisions on the merits. Lower courts were bound by the necessary rejection
of the issues and arguments raised in the jurisdictional statements of the
appellants.' 9 Of the four cases dismissed for want of a substantial federal
12. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
13. Id. at 1648.
14. Id. at 1649-50.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Aluminum Co. of America v. Sliman, 108 S. Ct. 2013 (1988); Playtex Holdings v.
O'Gilvie, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Downey Say. and Loan Ass'n,
108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Nielsen, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988).
18. American Gen. Life & Accident v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 2007 (1988); TreadweU Ford v.
Campbell, 108 S. Ct. 2007 (1988); Mobile Dodge, Inc. v. Alford, 108 S. Ct. 2008 (1988);
Alabama Power Co. v. Cantrell, 108 S. Ct. 2008 (1988).
19. At the time of these summary dispositions, cases decided by state supreme courts
questioning the validity of a state law as being repugnant to the laws or Constitution of the
United States arose within the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). The
Court was compelled to reach the merits of the dispute. Therefore, if the Court found want
of a substantial federal question, and summarily dismissed a case arising within the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, the decision became binding on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 344 (1975). Hence the lower courts were bound not only by the judgment reached in such
a summary disposition, but also the necessary rejection of the specific federal question
challenges brought before the Court. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). These
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question, three posed the question of whether a punitive award violates the
excessive fines clause3 °
For example, in American General Life & Accident v. Miller, the appellant
argued that punitive awards are constitutionally excessive when they are
greater than 700 times the maximum applicable criminal penalty and 140
times the compensatory award.2 Due to the binding effect on the issues
raised by the appellant in this case, lower courts were precluded from
holding that an award of punitive damages was unconstitutional under the
eighth amendment if the award was less than 700 times the applicable
criminal sanction for the punished activity or less than 140 times the
compensatory award.
Bankers Life and the three summary dispositions created some confusing
precedent for defendants and lower courts. Writing for the Court in Bankers
Life, Justice Marshall had issued a plea for a "well developed record and
a reasoned opinion on the merits" because the eighth amendment issue "is
a question of some moment and difficulty."2 Two weeks later, however,
by rejecting the eighth amendment challenge for lack of a substantial federal
question, the Court eliminated almost all possibility for a "well developed
record" or a "reasoned opinion on the merits."
With these confusing signals, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to
decide finally and conclusively the excessive fines argument. 23 The Court
seized upon an opportunity in Browning-Ferris.4
issues were not necessarily the issues raised before the lower court, but only those issues
presented in the jurisdictional statement before the United States Supreme Court. Id. Since
the time of these dispositions, Congress has amended the jurisdictional statute, making Supreme
Court review in this type of case discretionary rather than mandatory. Therefore, in the future,
the Supreme Court need not reach the merits in reviewing state laws of this character. If the
Court should choose in its discretion not to consider such a case, the Court will not be
creating precedent of any kind. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (West Supp. 1989).
20. In Mobile Dodge, the appellant argued that an award of $124,000 in punitive damages
is constitutionally excessive when such an award is at least 77 times the maximum criminal
penalty that could have been assessed for similar conduct. Brief of Appellant, Mobile Dodge,
Inc. v. Alford, 108 S. Ct. 2008 (1988) (No. 86-107). The Treadwell Ford case raised the issue
of whether a punitive award of $1.3 million is excessive because it is 500 times the maximum
applicable criminal penalty. Brief of Appellant, Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Campbell, 108 S. Ct.
2007 (1988) (No. 85-1799). Finally, the appellant in American Gen. Life argued that exemplary
damages of $350,000 violate the Constitution because the amount is 140 times the compensatory
award and 700 times the maximum applicable criminal penalty. Brief of Appellant, American
Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 2007 (1988) (No. 85-1429).
21. See supra note 20.
22. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1651.
23. See Greenhouse, Supreme Court Agrees to Weigh Putting Limits on Damage Awards,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 1; Calling All Deep Pockets, Wall St. J., June 2, 1988,
at 22, col. 1; Taylor, Court Fails to Consider Big Awards, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1988, at DI,
col. 3.
24. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 527 (1988).
19891
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Browning-Ferris involved alleged price cutting by Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries (BFI) in an attempt to eliminate a competitor, Kelco Disposal, from
the waste-disposal business. Kelco brought an action under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and under the tort law of Vermont, which creates an action
for interference with contractual relations. The jury found BFI liable on
both counts and awarded $51,146 in compensatory damages. Additionally,
the jury assessed $6 million in punitive liability. BFI ultimately appealed
the exemplary damages to the United States Supreme Court, arguing such
damages violate the excessive fines clause. 2n
Any hope for the excessive fines argument was completely shredded by
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. After giving an elaborate lesson on
the history of our Bill of Rights, the Court held the eighth amendment
"does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive
a share of the damages awarded." '26
Several reasons prompted the Court's strong language. The Court noted
that at the time the framers drafted the eighth amendment, 27 the word
"fine" meant a "payment to a sovereign as punishment." The amendment,
held the Court, was designed only to limit the power of the government. 28
This history dates not only to the English Bill of Rights, but also to the
Magna Carta and its prohibition against excessive amercements. 29 The Court
refused to "ignore the language of the Excessive Fines Clause, or its history,
or the theory on which it is based, in order to apply it to punitive damages."
On this reasoning, the Court upheld the $6 million award and rejected the
excessive fines clause argument.3 0
III. TBE DUE PROCESS OPINIONS
The Court in Browning-Ferris chose not to address the issue of whether
punitive awards violate due process. The majority side-stepped this challenge,
noting the petitioner had failed to raise the due process question in either
the district court or the court of appeals. In the Court's words, "[t]hat
inquiry must await another day.' ' a3
25. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2912-13.
26. Id. at 2914.
27. The framers copied the eighth amendment from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776. See Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1699 (1987).
28. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2915.
29. Id. at 2916-19. The excessive fines clause first originated in chapter 20 of the Magna
Carta, which prohibited excessive amercements, or monetary penalties levied for offenses
against the Crown. See Note, supra note 27, at 1714.
30. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920-21.
31. Id. at 2921.
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The concerns of six Supreme Court Justices shed light upon the Browning-
Ferris majority's invitation to raise the due process issue. A majority of the
current Court has expressed grave concern that the discretion given juries
in assessing punitive awards may violate due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 32
Justice O'Connor authored a concurring opinion in Bankers Life that
was the first to highlight the due process argument. Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justice Scalia, wrote:
Appellant has touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of
the Court's attention in an appropriate case. Mississippi law gives juries
discretion to award any amount of punitive damages in any tort case in
which a defendant acts with a certain mental state. In my view, because
of the punitive character of such awards, there is reason to think this
may violate the Due Process Clause.3
Justice O'Connor then indicated that the due process doctrine of void for
vagueness34 may invalidate punitive damage awards on two grounds: First,
the standards for determining what conduct can give rise to punitive damages
may be unconstitutionally vague. Second, the unbridled discretion given to
juries when deciding what amount of punitive damages is needed to punish
the defendant may also violate due process vagueness standards. 35
32. See Wermiel, Vote of 7-2 Leaves Open Question of Due Process in Granting the
Awards, Wall St. J., June 27, 1989, at A3, col. 3.
33. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1655 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. Courts have traditionally used the void for vagueness doctrine to invalidate criminal
statutory law that is too indefinite. A law "which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally
v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). This fundamental requirement of due
process applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 390. Corporations as
well as individuals enjoy the protections of the due process clause. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233
(1925); see also Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2925 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The void for vagueness doctrine protects against three hazards: lack of fair warning, unbridled
discretion, and overbreadth. See generally W. LAFAv & A. ScoT, CpuNA LAW § 2.3 (2d
ed. 1986). First, a law must not be so indefinite that reasonable people are denied notice or
warning of how the law applies. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. Second, enforcement of a
law cannot be subject to such unlimited discretion of a jury or trier of fact that its application
becomes arbitrary. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). Finally, if a law is susceptible
to an application which allows it to infringe constitutionally-protected rights, the law suffers
from overbreadth. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). After the decision in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (disallowing punitive damages in defamation cases
where the plaintiff does not prove malice), an allegation that punitive damage laws suffer
from overbreadth would probably be fruitless. They are not susceptible to a reading which
would infringe upon constitutionally-protected rights. For a discussion of the impact of Gertz,
see infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
35. O'Connor feels that the required mental state (willfulness or gross negligence) for
awarding punitive damages in Mississippi is probably described with sufficient definiteness.
However, she questions the lack of maximum penalty and the unbridled discretion given the
jury. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1655-56.
1989]
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After Bankers Life, Browning-Ferris revealed that three other Justices
would also question punitive damages on due process grounds. Justice
Stevens joined Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion, which specifically
reiterates the due process language of her Bankers Life concurrence 6
Further, in a concurring opinion, Justices Marshall and Brennan criticized
the unbridled discretion given a jury in determining the amount of a punitive
award. "[P]unitive damages are imposed by juries guided by little more
than an admonition to do what they think is best .... I for one would
look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages based on such
skeletal guidance .... -7
Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed essentially similar
dissatisfaction with exemplary awards. In Smith v. Wade" the Court faced
the question of what degree of culpability will permit a punitive award
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 9 The plaintiff was an inmate who sought to
recover damages from prison guards for injuries inflicted on the plaintiff
by other prisoners. The trial court had charged the jury that it could award
punitive damages upon a showing of "reckless or callous disregard of, or
indifference to, the rights or safety of others."' 4 Deliberating under this
instruction, the jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages. 41 The Supreme
Court held that punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 upon a
showing of recklessness. 42
Then Associate Justice Rehnquist, holding the view that punitive damages
under § 1983 require a showing of intentional misconduct, dissented from
the Court's judgment.4 3 Justice Rehnquist's opinion launched a frontal
assault on exemplary awards.
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are
entitled to receive full compensation for their injuries-but no more.
Even assuming that a punitive "fine" should be imposed after a civil
trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the plaintiff-who by
hypothesis is fully compensated. Moreover, although punitive damages
are "quasi-criminal, " their imposition is unaccompanied by the types
of safeguards present in criminal proceedings. This absence of safeguards
is exacerbated by the fact that punitive damages are frequently based
upon the caprice and prejudice of jurors. We observed in Electrical
Workers v. Foust that "punitive damages may be employed to punish
unpopular defendants," and noted elsewhere that "juries assess punitive
36. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
37. Id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 32-33 (emphasis omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation
to the actual harm caused." Finally, the alleged deterrence achieved by
punitive damages awards is likely outweighed by the costs-such as the
encouragement of unnecessary litigation and the chilling of desirable
conduct-flowing from the rule, at least when the standards on which
awards are based are ill-defined.-
Chief Justice Rehnquist thus appears troubled with the lack of safeguards
to protect against arbitrary decisions in the jury room. These concerns are
essentially the same as the due process concerns voiced by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia, and Stevens. It is likely, therefore, that the
Chief Justice could also be persuaded that the lack of safeguards violates
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The Court is poised to hear the due process argument. The Browning-
Ferris majority has invited the challenge. Moreover, five and possibly six
Justices appear disposed to declare punitive damages unconstitutional under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The defense bar's task is to create a
framework for applying the due process clause and to persuade a majority
of the Court to invalidate punitive damages.
IV. APPLYING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Punitive damages do not meet due process requirements. Punitive damages
deny defendants fair notice of when and to what extent courts will assess
exemplary awards. More importantly, punitive damage law generally gives
the trier of fact too much discretion in determining the amount of a
penalty.45 Thus, the typical law of punitive damages is void for vagueness
under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The first step in arguing that punitive damages are unconstitutional is
distinguishing Browning-Ferris. BFI asked the Court to hold that the eighth
amendment placed a cap on punitive awards, and the Court ruled that it
did not. This holding in no way affects the defense bar's argument under
the due process clause. The Browning-Ferris majority did not address the
question of whether defendants are entitled to notice of what amount of
punitive damages may be forthcoming. Neither did the Court face the
question of whether the jury is given too much discretion in awarding
punitive damages. The Court merely reviewed the history and purpose behind
the eighth amendment, and declared it inapplicable to the arena of private
lawsuits. Thus, nothing in Browning-Ferris limits either defendants' argu-
ments or remedies under the due process clause.
44. Id. at 59 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
45. See L. SAND, J. SIFFERT, S. REISS, J. SEXTON & J. THRoPE, III MODERN FEDERAL
JURY INsTRUCTIONs § 77.01, Instruction 77-5 (1988) [hereinafter JuRY INSTRu cIONs]; see also
CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 3294-95 (West Supp. 1989).
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
After distinguishing Browning-Ferris, the due process argument requires
two further steps: First, defendants must counter the argument that void
for vagueness is purely a creature of the criminal law. Second, defendants
must illustrate how the law currently applied in punitive damages cases is
indeed void for vagueness.
A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine Is Not a Purely Criminal
Safeguard
No Supreme Court precedent prevents the Court from applying the void
for vagueness doctrine to a common law civil penalty such as punitive
damages. Rather, existing Supreme Court precedent shows the doctrine
should apply.
The void for vagueness doctrine is not limited to statutory law.4 At least
two cases have applied the standard to common law crimes. In Cantwell v.
Connecticut,47 the Court faced a challenge to Connecticut's common law
crime of inciting a breach of peace. In Ashton v. Kentucky,4 the Supreme
Court examined Kentucky's common law crime of libel. In each case, the
Court invalidated the law as unconstitutionally vague, even though it was
non-statutory. 49 These two cases indicate the void for vagueness doctrine is
not limited to statutory law.
Just as the doctrine is not limited to statutory law, neither is it limited
to the criminal law. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,50 the Court invalidated a
Pennsylvania statute that permitted a jury to impose prosecution costs on
an acquitted criminal defendant whenever the jury chose to do so. The
statute imposed a civil remedy because it was designed to provide for the
collection of costs rather than to punish. The Court felt, however, that this
distinction between "punitive" and "civil" remedies was meaningless.
Whatever label be given the ... Act, there is no doubt that it provides
the State with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant of his
... property . . . and property [is] specifically protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment against any state deprivation which does not meet
the standards of due process .... 51
46. Note that some states have codified the standards for awarding punitive damages. See,
e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3294-3295 (West Supp. 1989).
47. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
48. 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
49. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307-11; Ashton, 384 U.S. at 200-01.
50. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
51. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of Giaccio, see infra text
accompanying notes 96-97.
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Therefore, it is not the existence of a label that gives rise to specificity
requirements. When the government attempts to take an individual's prop-
erty, it must comply with the requirements of due process.5 2
Giaccio also shows that the Court has invalidated common law elements
of a civil penalty on vagueness grounds. Although the Court was faced
with a civil statute in Giaccio, the Commonwealth argued that statutory
interpretation and appropriate jury instructions solved any due process
dilemmas. The Court noted, however, that such interpretations and instruc-
tions provided little help. The guidance given the jury through interpretation
of the statute and instructions from the trial court in determining when to
impose prosecution costs was no more definite and predictable than the
statute itself. "If used in a statute which imposed forfeitures, punishments
or judgments for costs, such loose and unlimiting terms would certainly
cause the statute to fail to measure up to the requirements of the Due
Process Clause . . ." and these terms are just as ineffective when they are
used to interpret an already vague statute.53 Therefore, common law inter-
pretations of a statutory civil penalty are subject to the same vagueness
principles as the statute itself. Logically, therefore, a purely common law
civil penalty should be subject to scrutiny under the void for vagueness
doctrine.
The void for vagueness doctrine cannot be limited to criminal statutes.
The Court has applied vagueness standards to both common law and
statutory penalties. Further, the vagueness doctrine is applicable to civil
penalties as well as criminal penalties. Although punitive damages are
typically awarded pursuant to the common law and are civil as opposed to
criminal penalties, the void for vagueness doctrine still applies.
The next step in the due process argument is showing that the purposes
behind the void for vagueness doctrine and punitive damages warrant its
application. The function of the void for vagueness doctrine fully supports
its application to punitive awards.
52. Additionally, in Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925), the
defendant alleged, as a defense to a contract claim, illegality under a federal statute. The
Court held that the civil statute in question was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 242. The
Court stated that it was not the existence of a criminal sanction that subjects a law to vagueness
standards. Instead, it is "the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which [is] so vague
and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." Id. at 239.
53. Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 404 (emphasis in original). It can also be argued that the void
for vagueness doctrine has been applied to punitive damages. The Supreme Court in Gertz v.
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), struck awards of punitive damages in defamation cases
unless the plaintiff can show knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at
349-50. The Court reasoned that the discretion given the jury would stifle first amendment
rights unless additional protection were provided defendants. Id. Although this is a first
amendment case, it rings of the void for vagueness doctrine and its protection against arbitrary
enforcement of the law. For a further discussion of Gertz, see infra text accompanying notes
87-91.
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One purpose of the void for vagueness doctrine is to require that society
not proscribe and penalize certain types of conduct without specifying what
is proscribed.5 4 If society wishes to penalize particular conduct, the Consti-
tution requires it do so in terms such that reasonable persons will not
disagree about what is being punished or how to punish those found to
have misbehaved. 5
Punitive damages serve to punish and deter certain conduct. Punitive
damages are not an attempt to compensate victims. Instead, they are
society's deliberate attempt to tell people what conduct it finds reprehensible.
Such conduct will be punished in an effort to deter others from engaging
in similar conduct in the future. Society is thus attempting through punitive
damages to proscribe conduct it finds outrageous, not by compensating the
victim of the conduct for the harm done him, but by punishing the
objectionable actor.5 6
The purpose behind punitive damages requires application of the void for
vagueness doctrine. It is not the existence of a criminal law that triggers
due process scrutiny. Rather, it is any attempt to deprive an individual of
his property. 7 When society attempts to exact "obedience to a rule or
standard . . ." through a threat to liberty or property, it must do so in
conformity with the due process clause.58 In awarding punitive damages the
state exacts obedience by depriving individuals of their property. 9 Therefore,
54. See supra note 34.
55. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56. In a case presenting the issue of whether to retroactively apply a new rule of law
adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court to a contest of punitive damages, the Indiana Court
of Appeals stated "in the area of criminal law it has long been recognized to be within the
province of the court to apply a new rule of law retrospectively . . . ." Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Dereach, 450 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The court went on to note
that punitive damages are designed to punish and not to compensate. The court therefore held
that the criminal protection extended to the civil defendant. Id.; see also supra notes 11-30
and accompanying text.
57. Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 400-02; see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
58. Small Co., 267 U.S. at 239.
59. Indeed, at least one state supreme court has recognized the punitive remedy is sufficiently
similar to criminal punishment to require heightened safeguards under the due process clause.
In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982), the Indiana Supreme
Court required proof by clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to the traditional prepon-
derance standard, in order to support a punitive award for breach of contract. Id. at 362-63.
The court noted plaintiffs have no legal right to punitive damages, and due process requires
increased protection of defendants' fundamental property right. Id. "[G]iven that the injured
party has been fully compensated, it is better to exonerate a wrongdoer from punitive damages,
even though his wrong be gross or wicked, than to award them at the expense of one whose
error was one that society can tolerate and who has already compensated the victim of his
error." Id. at 362.
In total, ten states have adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard, five states have
passed laws bifurcating punitive and compensatory damage determination, and eight states
have constrained the size of punitive damage awards. Goldberg, Punitives in Peril, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1989, at 46.
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the standards for awarding such damages must comply with specificity
requirements under the void for vagueness doctrine.
B. Punitive Damages Standards Do Not Meet Their Due Process
Burdens
Most state law standards for determining either the existence or the
amount of punitive liability are unconstitutionally vague. The constitutional
infirmity lies both in a lack of fair warning to potential defendants and in
giving the trier of fact too much discretion in imposing liability.
1. Lack of Notice
Potential defendants are denied fair notice of when and in what amount
punitive damages will be assessed. In some states, the standards for deter-
mining what conduct is "outrageous," are unconstitutionally vague. More
importantly, any state that does not establish a maximum award denies a
warning of how much penalty a court may assess.
Defendants can thus argue that the standards for determining what
conduct warrants punitive liability are void for vagueness. However, whether
this argument will succeed depends on how the jurisdiction describes the
proscribed conduct. The Restatement simply and inadequately describes the
requisite conduct as "outrageous. ' 26° Many jurisdictions, however, will only
award punitive damages upon some showing of a culpable mental state,
such as fraud, gross negligence, willfulness, wantonness, or malice. 61 For
example, the district court in Browning-Ferris required actual malice, out-
rageous conduct or a willful and wanton or reckless disregard of the
plaintiff's rights.62 Some state courts facing the due process argument have
held common law definitions of such terms are sufficient to provide the
public with fair notice. 63
Despite the existence of such jurisdictions, other states are like the
Restatement in penalizing conduct that is not so clearly described by judicial
interpretation. For example, an essential element triggering punitive damages
for breach of contract in Indiana is that the public interest would be served
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 908.
61. D. DoBns, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES: DAmAOES - EQuriy - REsTrr=TTON §
3.9 (1973).
62. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2913 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979) (overruled on
different grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 (Alaska 1985)); Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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by the deterrent effect of such an award. 64 This element is far less susceptible
to common law gloss than the element of gross negligence. 5
Whether defendants can challenge the standards for imposing liability
depends upon the jurisdiction. In some states, common law definitions
answer this challenge. In other states, however, clear definitions do not
exist. In challenging punitive damages in the latter type of jurisdiction,
defendants must be careful to make and preserve the notice argument.
Moreover, even if the substantive standards are not indefinite enough to
deny the public fair warning of potential liability, most punitive damages
should be struck for lack of an upper limit on the amount.66 Potential
defendants are denied fair notice of how great the penalty for outrageous
conduct may be when there is no limit to financial liability. The void for
vagueness doctrine, which serves to prevent states from imposing a penalty
when there is doubt about what punishment may be imposed, therefore
requires that punitive damage law be voided unless and until the legislatures
provide the constitutionally required cap on liability.
The cases of United States v. Evans67 and United States v. Batchelder-6
show that due process requires fair notice at the penalty stage of trial. In
Evans, the Court held a federal statute void for vagueness. Congress
intended the statute to criminalize the concealing or harboring of illegal
aliens. The Court held the statute void for vagueness because the penalty
for breaking the law was too uncertain. 69 The Court relied on an institutional
argument.70 It is the job of the legislature, not the courts, to establish
penalties for crimes. Depending on how one read the statute, there were at
least three or four possible punishments that Congress could have intended.
The government asked the Court to adopt and apply the one reading that
most nearly coincided with Congress' intended criminal proscription. 7' This
the Court refused to do. "[I]n our system .. .defining crimes and fixing
64. Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977).
65. Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court later realized this problem. After attempting to
harmonize seemingly irreconcilable cases, and noting the standard often resulted in unpredict-
able results, the court adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard for punitive damages
in breach of contract cases. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 358-65
(Ind. 1982).
66. There should be no due process problem with establishing the limit as a multiple of
compensatory damages. Compensatory damages must be proved by competent evidence.
Defendants should reasonably be able to predict the compensatory liability likely to result
from action or inaction. Chief Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula presupposes this
predictability. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). If
defendants can predict their compensatory liability, they can apply the multiple and predict
their punitive liability.
67. 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
68. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
69. Evans, 333 U.S. at 495.
70. Id. at 484-85.
71. Id.
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penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions." 72 Therefore, the Court sent
the statute back to Congress to remedy the uncertainty. 73 However, defen-
dants should not rely on Evans alone in arguing that punitive damage law
is void for vagueness because the Evans Court did not expressly address
the issue of fair notice.
The Batchelder Court, however, cited Evans for the proposition that
penalties must be described with certainty, and added an interesting twist.
The Court faced a federal statute with two overlapping provisions that
prohibited convicted felons from receiving firearms. Each provision, how-
ever, authorized a different maximum penalty. The Court found no due
process problem with leaving violators uncertain of which crime would be
charged. In resolving the constitutional issue, however, the Court expanded
upon the analysis in Evans and indicated due process requires notice at the
sentencing stage of punishment. "A criminal statute is therefore invalid if
it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden. So too, vague sentencing provisions may pose
constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the
consequences of violating a given criminal statute." 74
Although criminal statutes were involved in Evans and Batchelder, the
reasoning of each case indicates the void for vagueness doctrine applies not
only to the substantive standards for imposing liability, but also to the
amount of liability that may be imposed. It is as much a denial of due
process for a state to be indefinite about the maximum applicable penalty
as it is for the state to be indefinite about when that penalty may be
imposed. With punitive damages, defendants lack all warning of how much
penalty may be awarded for outrageous conduct. So long as there is no
notice of the maximum applicable penalty, due process is denied.
2. Jury Discretion
The problem of unbridled jury discretion presents an even greater con-
stitutional pitfall for punitive damages. After finding outrageous conduct,
juries are given total discretion in determining when to award punitive
damages and in what amount. 7
A typical jury instruction highlights the discretion given the jury:
72. Id. at 486.
73. This case should be a very persuasive precedent against punitive damages with Justices
Brennan and Marshall. They maintain that it is not the job of the jury but of "responsible
officials" (presumably legislatures) to establish penalties. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at
2923 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a further discussion of Evans, see infra text accompanying
notes 98-100.
74. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123 (citations omitted).
75. See D. DoaBs, supra note 61, at § 3.9; see also Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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If you should find that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's injuries,
then you have the discretion to award, in addition to compensatory
damages, punitive damages. You may award punitive damages if the
plaintiff proves that the defendant's conduct was wanton and reckless,
not merely unreasonable. An action is wanton and reckless if it is done
in such a manner, and under such circumstances, as to reflect utter
disregard for the potential consequences of the act on the safety and
rights of others. The purposes of punitive damages is [sic] to punish a
defendant for shocking conduct and to set an example in order to deter
him and others from committing similar acts in the future. Punitive
damages are intended to protect the community and to be an expression
of the jury's indignation at the misconduct.
The awarding of punitive damages is within your discretion-you are
not required to award them. Punitive damages are appropriate only for
especially shocking and offensive misconduct. If you decide to award
punitive damages, you must use sound reason in setting the amount-
it must not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party. But
the amount can be as large as you believe necessary to fulfill the purpose
of punitive damages. In this regard, you may consider the financial
resources of the defendant in fixing the amount of punitive damages
and you may impose punitive damages against one or more of the
defendants, and not others, or against more than one defendant in
different amounts . 76
A jury deliberating under this instruction proceeds with nearly unlimited
freedom to decide the defendant's fate. The jury is not obligated to award
exemplary damages, even though the elements of wantonness and reckless-
ness are found. Moreover, other than consideration of the defendant's
financial resources, the jury is given no guidance in setting the amount of
an award. The amount can be as large as the jury deems necessary.
One can see the constitutional problems from such absolute discretion
even more clearly in the line of cases limiting the states' ability to impose
capital punishment. Due process is denied when too much discretion is given
the jury in imposing the death penalty.
a. The Death Penalty Cases
The due process clause has not always protected against the arbitrary
imposition of capital punishment. In McGautha v. California,77 the Supreme
Court faced a due process challenge to the death penalty. The issue was
whether leaving the decision to impose the death penalty to the jury's sole
discretion violates due process. 7s The Court held that the due process clause
did not serve to limit the totally discretionary imposition of such a penalty. 79
76. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 45.
77. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
78. Id. at 185.
79. Id. at 207-08.
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Based on McGautha alone, there would be no argument that unbridled jury
discretion in penalty decisions violates the due process clause.
McGautha has been implicitly overruled, however, by Gardner v. Florida.s0
In Gardner, the trial judge considered confidential information which was
not admitted into evidence, was not subject to challenge by the defendant,
and was not part of the official record. Relying on this evidence, the judge
disregarded the jury's recommendation of leniency in a capital case." The
Supreme Court held the imposition of death under such circumstances is
unconstitutional. 2 Justice Stevens noted that if such a penalty were allowed
to stand, capital punishment would become arbitrary. Such a determination
would place too much discretion with the trial judge and would allow little
opportunity for the appellate court to determine if the discretion had been
abused. 83
The Court decided Gardner under the due process clause, not the cruel
and unusual punishment clause.
[I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself,
must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause .... The
defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure
which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right
to object to a particular result of the sentencing process."
After Gardner, the due process clause protects against arbitrary sentencing
in capital cases. Yet, McGautha held arbitrariness in sentencing inflicted no
due process violations. The reasoning supporting Gardner is inconsistent
with and in opposition to the Court's holding in McGautha. The only
possible conclusion from Gardner is that the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments serve to limit death penalty sentencing when too much discretion is
given the trier of fact in imposing capital punishment.
b. Arbitrary Penalties in Other Settings
The reasoning of Gardner is not limited to death penalty cases. Although
the Court has noted that "death is a different kind of punishment,18 5 there
80. 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion). The analysis adopted in McGautha was initially
undercut by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, the same
challenge to unbridled jury discretion was made; however, the challenge was based on the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. The Supreme Court held that the penalty of death under
such circumstances violates the eighth amendment. The Justices, feeling "imprisoned in the
McGautha holding," found that such a discretionary imposition of death is unconstitutional.
Id. at 256-57 (Douglass, J., concurring); id. at 274-77 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-
10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351-54.
82. Id. at 351.
83. Id. at 360-61.
84. Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 357 (citation omitted).
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is simply no reason why the principle that one should not be subject to the
jury's unbridled discretion when being punished should be limited to capital
punishment settings.
Due process is not an inflexible standard. When the penalty is death, due
process requires greater protections because of the gravity and finality of
capital punishment. Therefore, states must specifically outline aggravating
circumstances that will qualify a murderer for the death penalty.16 However,
due process should protect against arbitrariness at the sentencing stage even
when a jury is imposing a lesser penalty. When the penalty is death,
procedural safeguards will be strict because of what is at stake. With a
monetary penalty, the safeguards need not be so strict because the defendant
does not face such a grave risk. However, the safeguards should be precise
enough to prevent the imposition of an arbitrary penalty at the whim of a
jury.
The Supreme Court has implicitly supported this view in the arena of
punitive damages. The Supreme Court has noted the threat from uncon-
trolled jury discretion in awarding exemplary damages, and has held such
damages uncollectible in certain settings.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,87 the Court held states may not permit
recovery of punitive damages in defamation suits when liability is not based
at least on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth." The Court
felt the jury's uncontrolled discretion would lead to the punishment of
unpopular opinions and would lead to awards in unpredictable amounts.
Therefore, first amendment freedoms would be squelched.8 9 The same
problem does not exist when a jury is awarding compensatory damages
because the jury is given "appropriate instructions" and an award must be
"supported by competent evidence."' 9
Although Gertz is a first amendment case, the decision is based on
essentially a procedural constitutional problem. If protections against arbi-
trary juries existed, then first amendment freedoms could not be curtailed
by punitive damages. However, juries can be arbitrary in making exemplary
awards. Due process questions are posed when arbitrariness allows a trier
of fact to tread upon constitutionally protected rights.91 Because traditional
punitive damages would allow juries to tread upon the first amendment,
plaintiffs must demonstrate a higher degree of culpability in order to collect
punitive damages. Gertz involved the freedom of expression, but the con-
stitutional shortcoming was procedural.
86. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
87. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
88. Id. at 349.
89. Id. at 349-50.
90. Id. at 350.
91. See supra note 34 and its discussion of overbreadth as a void for vagueness protection.
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Additionally, the Supreme Court has denied the collection of punitive
damages under a federal statute. In Electrical Workers v. Foust,92 the Court
considered whether an employee could collect punitive damages from his
union for breach of the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor
Act. 93 The Court noted that the broad discretion given juries under the
statute would result in unpredictable and sizeable awards which would
deplete union treasuries,94 and proceeded to hold that such damages were
not collectible. 95
The Court has also voiced its concern over statutes that give the jury too
much discretion in doling out a civil penalty. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,96
the Court declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that allowed
juries too much discretion. The statute permitted juries to assess prosecution
costs against a criminal defendant who had been acquitted whenever they
felt it appropriate to do so. There was no requirement that the costs be
imposed on every acquitted defendant, nor was the jury given any significant
guidance in deciding when to impose the civil penalty. The Court invalidated
the statute and stated "the ... Act is invalid under the Due Process Clause
because of vagueness and the absence of any standards sufficient to enable
defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory im-
positions of costs." 97
Juries in punitive damage cases are given far-reaching discretion similar
to that afforded by the unconstitutional statute in Giaccio. The jury is not
told it must always award punitive damages when it finds outrageous
conduct, nor is the jury given any significant guidance in deciding which
cases of outrageous conduct are more deserving of an award than others.
When a jury is given too much discretion in deciding when to punish, the
penalty treads impermissibly upon due process.
The Court has further noted that penalty determination is the job of the
legislature and not the courts. United States v. Evans98 is a statutory
interpretation case with due process ramifications. Congress was ambiguous
about what penalty to impose for different violations of the Immigration
Act of 1917. The Court refused to adopt the government's position of
interpreting the statute to punish conduct that Congress unquestionably
meant to punish. Instead, the Court, placing the onus on Congress to clarify
the standards, stated, "separate offenses ... might require, in any sound
92. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 50.
95. Id. at 52.
96. 382 U.S. 399 (1966). For a discussion of other aspects of Giaccio, see supra notes 50-
53 and accompanying text.
97. Id. at 400-02.
98. 333 U.S. 483 (1948). For another discussion of Evans, see supra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text.
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legislative judgment, very different penalties .... That is essentially the
sort of judgment legislatures rather than courts should make." 99 By the
same token, the absence of standards in determining punitive damages
makes such penalties subject to extremely vague and arbitrary enforcement.
"Separate offenses" worthy of very different penalties might receive the
same punishment. Worse yet, the more culpable or wealthier actor may be
punished substantially less than the less culpable actor.
As in Evans, courts may not be asked to proceed blindly. Justices Brennan
and Marshall seem persuaded by this argument. They imply it is the job of
legislatures, rather than juries, to establish a range of penalties and standards
for the determination of penalty amounts.'00
c. Due Process Requirements Under Mathews v. Eldridge
The existing cases concerning penalty determination-whether it be death,
incarceration, or monetary damages-indicate the due process clause protects
against the arbitrary imposition of punishment by a jury. The due process
clause strictly limits the jury's ability to arbitrarily impose the death penalty.
The Supreme Court has recognized fatal constitutional deficiencies in pro-
cedural measures that foster arbitrariness in punitive damage determinations.
Further, the Court has not hesitated to utilize the due process clause when
a jury is given too much discretion in choosing when to impose a civil
penalty. The Court has noted that it is the legislature's job to establish
punishment. Thus, due process requirements against unbridled jury discre-
tion at the punishment stage of trial are not limited to death penalty cases.
The due process clause protects against arbitrariness in any setting.
The remaining issue is whether procedures currently employed in punitive
damage settings adequately fulfill the due process burden. The Supreme
Court opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge0 1 provides guidance in answering
this question.
In Mathews, the plaintiff had collected Social Security disability benefits
for a number of years. The state agency charged with monitoring his
medical condition determined he was neither disabled nor entitled to Social
Security benefits. The plaintiff filed suit in federal court, challenging the
termination of benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing on disability. The
99. Id. at 489-90.
100. "I for one would look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages based on
such skeletal guidance than I would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which
responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed." Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923
(Brennan, J., concurring).
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For an overview of Mathews as applied to punitive damages, see
generally Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69
VA. L. REv. 269 (1983).
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Supreme Court rejected this challenge and held that due process did not
require such adjudicatory process. 02
The Court, after noting that due process is a flexible standard that
changes with the times and the situation, 03 adopted a balancing test for
determining due process requirements.' 4 To determine whether existing
procedural safeguards satisfy due process in a given situation, three elements
must be examined: first, the private interests that will be affected by official
action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such private interests
through existing procedures and protections as compared to the probable
value of substitute or additional procedures or protections; and third, the
state's interests, including the benefits accruing to the state from existing
procedures, and the burdens of requiring additional procedures. 0 5
The Mathews balancing test should be applied to determine whether
current procedures in punitive damage determination satisfy due process.
Courts have traditionally looked to Mathews in determining when due
process requires that an individual receive an adjudicatory hearing.: 6 How-
ever, if courts look to Mathews to determine when someone is entitled to
adjudicatory process, they should also look to Mathews to determine what
procedures are required to render the hearing "adjudicatory." Indeed, the
Supreme Court has used Mathews to decide what safeguards are "due" in
such a hearing.
In Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,10 7 the Court
used Mathews to determine whether limiting the fee of an attorney who
represents a veteran seeking benefits denies the veteran due process by
denying him the right to retain counsel of his choice. 10 If it is appropriate
for a court to use Mathews in determining what safeguards are required at
an adjudicatory hearing, it should also be appropriate for a court to use
Mathews in determining what safeguards are required at a judicial hearing
or trial. In both cases, the court must decide the same issue: whether
sufficient safeguards exist to protect against arbitrariness. Logic requires
that courts answer this question by applying the same test.' 9
102. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323-26. "Adjudicatory process" is a term of art meaning a
"[mlethod of adjudicating factual disputes; used generally in reference to administrative
proceedings in contrast to judicial proceedings." BLACK's LAw DicTONARY 40 (5th ed. 1979).
103. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
104. Id. at 335.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 537 n.2 (1985); Mackey
v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1979); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3
(1978).
107. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
108. Id. at 312-13.
109. For an overview of Mathews, see generally J. NowAx, R. RoTUNDA & J. YoUNG,
CoNsrrrtrroNAL LAW §§ 13.8-.9 (3d ed. 1986).
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The Mathews balancing test indicates existing protections in punitive
damage cases do not meet the requirements of due process. The jury has
total discretion in determining when and in what amount to award punitive
damages. Under Mathews the risk of arbitrary decisions is simply too grave.
First, the private interests at stake are great. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant in a punitive damage case have a constitutionally-protected inter-
est: property. The defendant may be forced to relinquish his property
pursuant to the court's award. Alternatively, the court may choose to deny
the plaintiff punitive relief. The plaintiff would therefore be deprived of
his property interest in a chose in action. 10 The fifth and fourteenth
amendments require that property not be taken without due process of
law."' The private interests, when viewed from this light, are great.
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of these private property
interests is tremendous in some jurisdictions. Courts typically instruct the
jury that it need not award punitive damages even though it finds the
essential elements for such liability. Rather, the jury can award any amount
it believes necessary to serve the purposes behind punitive damages." 2 Some
defendants may be required to pay large sums of money when the purpose
of punishing and deterring outrageous conduct does not warrant such
measures. Concurrently, some plaintiffs may be denied these large sums of
money when they should have received them. Such erroneous decisions will
naturally result from an indefinite standard for arriving at an amount of
liability. Moreover, because the decisions of when and in what amount to
award punitive damages are typically in the jury's discretion, and because
the basis for the jury's decision is not a part of the official record, appellate
review is limited.
The risk of an erroneous and unreviewable result would be greatly reduced
by establishing more specific standards for assessing damage awards. Stan-
dards could be established that would base the size of an award on specific
characteristics of the defendant or the defendant's conduct. For example,
larger awards could be levied on wealthy corporate defendants to achieve
meaningful deterrent effects. Conduct causing personal injury or death
could be punished more severely than conduct causing financial harm. States
could draft the standards so that the conduct most deserving of punishment
would be punished the most. Regardless of what the legislative judgments
may be, due process requires standards that are clear such that reasonable
people will not differ as to their application. If courts require legislatures
to provide clear standards, it is much less likely that juries will punish or
not punish defendants when the purposes of punitive damages require a
different result.
110. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1096 (5th ed. 1979).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV.
112. See JuRY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 45.
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Third and finally, a consideration of the state's interests lends support
to the argument that due process requires limits on the jury's discretion.
The government's interests in punitive damages are punishment and deter-
rence. The burden of drafting more specific standards for determining
awards does not seem great in light of the enhanced deterrent effects society
would enjoy. It is difficult to get a deterrent effect when defendants do not
understand how a court will decide punishment. However, if defendants
were specifically informed before engaging in outrageous conduct that they
would be financially ruined by the ensuing litigation, rational defendants
would not engage in the conduct. Thus, the "burden" of enacting standards
to curb arbitrary decisions should not harm the state's interests in punitive
damages. Rather, it should advance those very interests.
Under Mathews, courts should invoke the due process clause of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to invalidate punitive damage law when it
allows unbridled jury discretion. As long as the jury has such discretion in
determining damages, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the constitution-
ally-protected private interest in property is too great. If legislatures adopted
more specific standards, the risk of an erroneous deprivation would be
vastly reduced. By forcing legislatures either to reform punitive damage law
or forgo its benefits, the courts would not harm state or federal interests
in punishment and deterrence. On the contrary, those interests would be
materially advanced.
C. Legislative Action
Legislative action is necessary to mend the constitutional infirmities of
punitive damage law. To eliminate the lack of fair warning, legislatures
must impose a maximum limit on punitive awards.113 To deal with the
problem of unbridled discretion, legislatures must give juries standards for
determining the occasions for and the amount of exemplary damages.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that damage awards need be
unduly limited by legislative action. Legislatures are free to determine that
certain conduct by certain defendants goes beyond the pale and should be
absolutely deterred. For example, if a corporate decision to risk hundreds
of lives based on a cost-benefit analysis fits within the category of absolutely
unacceptable behavior, total deterrence could be accomplished without con-
stitutional infirmity by setting the maximum penalty equal to the corporate
defendant's gross revenue for the previous fifty years. 14
113. And in those states where the substantive standards for liability are arguably unclear,
more specific standards are needed. See supra note 59.
114. Perhaps a statute drawn along these lines would cut too broadly, because many activities
which society encourages will risk human life based on some modified form of cost-benefit
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Legislative action will result in defendants being able to predict what
penalty will be imposed for misconduct. Such predictability has long coin-
cided with the generally acceptable deterrent effects of the criminal law.
There is no good reason why defendants in punitive damage cases are
entitled to less.
V. DUE PROCESS: THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE
Although Browning-Ferris has left only the due process clause for defen-
dants to wield against punitive damages, the due process clause was the
proper weapon all along. The due process clause is much more effective
than the excessive fines clause at solving the essential social problems with
punitive damages, which were noted by Justice O'Connor in her Browning-
Ferris dissent.
Justice O'Connor observed two major problems with punitive damages.
First, awards are skyrocketing. Second, the unpredictability of huge punitive
awards is curbing research and development in many industries." 5 The
analysis. For instance, all automobiles, not just the Pinto, risk lives. However, as a society
we do not feel that this risk outweighs the benefits that automobiles bring to society. Similarly,
the building of skyscrapers and even the sale of aspirin risk lives.
Society has indicated, though, that these activities are not to be discouraged, but encouraged.
Thus a statute imposing the maximum penalty on a corporation because the defendant has
risked human life based on a cost-benefit analysis would probably be too broad. Society is
concerned when corporations under-value human life and over-value the benefits accruing from
an activity. It would pose no problem to narrow adequately the scope of the penalty statute,
however. For instance, the maximum penalty could be imposed upon a corporation that
knowingly risks lives by selling a product which could have been feasibly designed so as
reasonably to prevent the risk. A feasible design change might be any change that could be
implemented without significantly altering the price of the product. Risking a human life would
not necessarily include the risk of lives lost due to the blatant and knowing misuse of the
product by the consumer. Such a statute would bring the makers of the Ford Pinto within its
scope, but would exclude the makers of Bayer Aspirin.
115. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor notes that as recently as ten years
ago, the largest punitive award affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was
$250,000. Today, awards as great as $40 million have been sustained. The threat of these huge
awards, she claims, has curbed development in the prescription drug industry, the airline
industry, and the automobile industry. Id.
There is solid evidence supporting Justice O'Connor's observations on these industries.
Statistics show a notable increase during the 1980's in both the number of punitive awards
and the percentage of cases in which punitive damages were awarded. In both Cook County,
Illinois, and San Francisco County, California, the percentage of cases in which punitive
damages were awarded during the period 1980 through 1984 was nearly double the percentage
for the years 1975 through 1979. M. P-ETRSON, S. SARM & M. SHANLEY, PtmrrV DAmAG.s:
EmipnucAL FiNDINGS 9 (1987). Indeed during 1980 through 1984, punitive damages were awarded
to plaintiffs in roughly one-third of those cases finding compensatory liability in commercial
disputes in San Francisco County. Id. at 11.
There is also evidence that the size of individual punitive damage awards has been growing.
The total amount of money awarded as punitive damages during 1980 through 1984 in Cook
County, Illinois, increased by 800 percent, adjusted for inflation, over that awarded during
1975 through 1979. Id. at 14-15. During this same period, the median award tripled and the
average award more than quadrupled. Id. at 17. Because the average is growing more quickly
than the median, these statistics indicate the size of the largest awards is growing. Id.
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excessive fines argument would have done nothing to solve these problems.
Courts would have grappled with the concept of "excessiveness." Although
there was some commentary on how this term might be defined,116 there
was no way to define it in any manner allowing reasonable predictability.
The problems Justice O'Connor noted would have gone unsolved by the
eighth amendment.
However, the due process clause sufficiently solves the problems that
Justice O'Connor noted. First, the size of awards would no longer be of
concern. If defendants are told what conduct will give rise to punitive
liability, what the jury will consider in assessing an award, and what the
maximum award will be, society need not be concerned when, in the face
of such notice, a defendant engages in reprehensible conduct and receives
the maximum penalty. The skyrocketing liability problem would be placed
within the control of the defendants themselves. A party with control over
its problem should not be heard to complain of it.
Second, there would be no problem with research and development under
the due process approach. If businesses were aware of what conduct would
warrant punitive damages and what the jury would consider in assessing
punitive damages, proper research and development would not be adversely
affected. Businesses would know whether they were engaging in marginal
conduct, and would only curb development in areas of unacceptable conduct
where they risk potential liability for punitive damages.
The better challenge to punitive damages has always been the due process
clause. It stands on more solid ground substantively, and it provides a
better solution to the problems facing business and industry. With a majority
of the Court waiting to hear this argument, constitutional challenges to
punitive damages have not been set back by Browning-Ferris. Instead, the
proper arrow may be drawn from the constitutional quiver for an attack
that appears stronger than ever.
116. See Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework
for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALiF. L. REv. 1433 (1987).
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